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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to use insights
from the theory of accommodation to
study in a uniform way different kinds of
acts involved in situated dialogue. When
interlocutors are engaged in situated di-
alogue, their informational states evolve
through dialogue acts, physical acts and
sensing acts. We model this evolution in a
non-traditional conversational system us-
ing tools from mature branches of artificial
intelligence. In particular, we use a plan-
ner that is able to find plans in the pres-
ence of incomplete knowledge and sens-
ing: PKS (Petrick and Bacchus, 2002).
In the resulting model, we study the in-
teractions among dialogue acts, physical
acts and sensing acts, and their relation-
ship with accommodation.
1 Introduction
The phenomena of accommodation has been
widely studied from philosophical and linguis-
tic perspectives, ranging from classical pa-
pers like (Lewis, 1979) to recent contributions
like (Beaver and Zeevat, 2007). We view accom-
modation theory as a schema in which to study, in
a uniform way, the different kinds of acts that oc-
cur in situated dialogue. We not only believe that
such an approach can help us obtain better models
of dialogue, but also that dialogue is an essential
setting in which to test such theories, theories that
are too frequently divorced from the commonest
setting of language use: situated conversation.
When interlocutors are engaged in situated di-
alogue, it is evident that their informational states
evolve as a result of the dialogue acts performed
during the task, and through the physical acts that
interlocutors perform on their environment. But
their states are also updated with the information
that the participants sense from their environment;
embedded agents do not have complete informa-
tion about the world but they can sense it.
The approach presented here uses insights (and
tools) from mature branches of artificial intelli-
gence, such as planning with incomplete knowl-
edge and sensing, in order to build a model for
non-traditional conversational systems. In gen-
eral, traditional conversational systems assume
that conversational partners share common goals
and collaborate in order to perform the task at hand
as efficiently as possible. Our setup explores a
case where conversational partners do not share a
common goal and they are not as cooperative as
partners involved in task-oriented dialogue. Our
setup is a text-adventure game, where one of the
participants is the player and the other participant
is the game. The game has all the information
needed to solve the game task but this is not its
goal; its goal is to make the interaction engaging
and challenging, encouraging the player to explore
and discover the game world.
This work is part of a larger project on reconcil-
ing linguistic reasoning and collaborative reason-
ing in conversation (Benotti, 2007; Benotti, 2008).
We advance this program here by adding to our
model the treatment of sensing actions. To this
end, we have integrated in a conversational system
a planner that is able to find plans in the presence
of incomplete knowledge and sensing: PKS (Pet-
rick and Bacchus, 2002). In the resulting model,
we study the interactions among dialogue acts,
physical acts and sensing acts. We believe that
this issue relates in relevant ways with the theo-
retical question: “In which contexts can sentences
that have particular implicatures felicitously oc-
cur?” Following (Beaver, 1994) we believe this
to be a better formulation of the problem of ac-
commodation than the traditional question: “What
inferences do people draw from sentences?”
2 Accommodating when talking, acting
and sensing: everyday examples
Accommodation and grounding of dialogue and
physical acts are topics that have been widely stud-
ied. But the study of accommodation and ground-
ing of sensing acts is also essential when agents
are embedded. Moreover, even when interlocu-
tors are co-situated, sensing acts are usually less
evident than physical and dialogue acts. Hence,
an important question to study is “When is the
common ground of the dialogue updated with the
sensed information?” Or in other words, “When is
there in the state of the activity enough evidence
that a piece of information has been sensed?”
Let us address these questions with an example:
In kindergarden, the teacher showed a green
square to a boy and, offering a piece of paper, told
him: “Paint a circle that has this same color”.
This simple example illustrates the interaction
of a dialogue act performed by the teacher (re-
quest) with a sensing action (sense color) and a
physical action (paint) that the teacher expects
from the boy. When giving this instruction the
teacher relied on the ability of the boy to sense
the colors, but the sensing action is left tacit in the
teacher request. She could have make it explicit
saying “Look at the color of the square and paint
a circle that has the same color”. However in con-
versation, sensing actions are more naturally left
tacit than made explicit. Why? Because they are
so natural for sensing agents (indeed, sometimes
they are unavoidable) that it is extremely easy to
take them for granted.
Now we are going to look at this example as an
instance of the general rule of accommodation in-
troduced by Lewis in the article in which he coins
the word accommodation:
If at time t something is said that requires compo-
nent sn of conversational score to have a value
in the range r if what is said is to be true, or
otherwise acceptable; and if sn does not have a
value in the range r just before t; and if such and
such further conditions hold; then at t the score-
component sn takes some value in the range r.
(Lewis, 1979, p.347)
This rule will help us perform a detailed analy-
sis of our example in order to address the questions
raised in the beginning of this section. Bearing this
schema in mind, let us analyze step by step the dif-
ferent values that the variables of the rule take for
our simple example. First of all, what’s t? This is
what Stalnaker has to say here:
The prior context that is relevant to the interpreta-
tion of a speech act is the context as it is changed
by the fact that the speech act was made, but prior
to the acceptance or rejection of the speech act.
(Stalnaker, 1998, p.8)
So in our example t is the time right after the
teacher said “Paint a circle that has this same
color” but before the acceptance or rejection of
this request.
Now, let us determine what the relevant compo-
nents sn are. Suppose that the boy is color blind
and the teacher knows it. Then her request does
not make much sense and any side participant and
the boy himself will start asking what the goal of
the request is, because clearly it cannot be the lit-
eral one: to obtain a green circle. Therefore, the
color referred to by the teacher is the s1 of our
example. And if what the teacher said is to be ac-
ceptable, s1 is required to have a particular value
r1; the same color than the square has in the real
world (or in fact, a representation of it). Further-
more, there is no evidence that s1 already has the
value r1 before the teacher began to speak (that
is, there is no evidence that the color has been un-
der discussion before), so we can assume that it
doesn’t.
Now, what are the further conditions that need
to hold so that, at t, the score-component s1 takes
some value r1? The teacher and the boy both know
(at least intuitively) that people can sense their en-
vironment, that members of the same culture usu-
ally assign the same name to the same parts of
the spectrum of colors, that humans can remember
facts that they sense, that the sensed object is ac-
cessible, that a person will actually sense the color
of an object if he is required to know this fact; the
teacher and the boy rely on these and many other
things that are usually taken for granted. All this
knowledge is necessary for the boy to come up
with the right sequence of actions in order to re-
spond to the teacher’s request; that is, in order to
sense the color of the square and paint the circle.
Following Lewis, we would finish our instanti-
ation of the rule of accommodation with the fact
that at the time t the score-component s1 takes
value r1. Two last comments are in order here.
First, it is worth pointing out that at the moment
t the request has not yet been accepted or rejected
but the addressee has already taken it in and ad-
justed himself to the fact that the dialogue act has
been performed. The acceptance or rejection can
be seen as a second change to the conversational
record that ocurrs after the rule of accommoda-
tion applies. It’s very important to distinguish be-
tween these two changes. Why? Because even if
the request is rejected, the update of the conver-
sational record that resulted from the accommoda-
tion may remain. Even if the boy answers “I don’t
like green. I won’t do it”, we know that the boy
sensed the color of the square.
Second, how does the score-component s1 takes
value r1? This is a question that is not directly ad-
dressed by Lewis but he seems to suggest is that s1
takes value r1 and nothing else changes. However,
we agree with (Thomason et al., 2006; Hobbs et
al., 1993; Kreutel and Matheson, 2003) that what
is accommodated in order for s1 to take value r1
could be much more than just this fact. If we
claimed that only s1 changes, how can we explain
the fact that the boy may take off a blindfold (he
was playing “Blind man’s bluff”) after hearing the
teacher? The required updates can also have their
requirements (or preconditions) and side-effects,
and we think that a natural way to model the ac-
commodation updates is through tacit acts.
We adhere then to the view that explains
Lewis’ broad notion of accommodation (not lim-
ited to classical cases of presupposition accom-
modation) as tacit acts. Physical acts can be left
tacit (Benotti, 2007), dialogue acts can be left
tacit (Kreutel and Matheson, 2003; Thomason et
al., 2006), but also sensing acts can be left tacit
(this paper, Section 4). This is not a new idea then,
but it’s a promising approach and needs to be fur-
ther developed.
The analysis of our example so far has given us
some insight on the questions that were raised in
the beginning of this section. We have seen that
tacit sensing can be grounded even if the dialogue
act that required the sensing is directly rejected
(the “boy doesn’t like green” example). And it can
also be the case that the tacit sensing is grounded
even if it cannot be directly executed because, for
instance, it requires the execution of some physi-
cal act first (the “Blind man’s bluff” example). The
interactions among sensing acts, dialogue acts and
physical acts can be extremely subtle; modelling
them (putting sensing, physical and dialogue acts
in a common schema) and, in particular making
explicit the information at play, is the topic of the
rest of this paper.
But first, let us have a look at a few more ev-
eryday examples; the aim of these instances is to
show how frequent and pervasive are the interac-
tions among different kinds of acts.
2.1 Tacit sensing and referring
If referring is treated as a dialogue act on its own,
as many current dialogue systems do (DeVault and
Stone, 2006), then the interaction between tacit
physical action, tacit sensing action and referring
acts need to be controlled. Consider this example:
Suppose that you are told that the hidden treasure
you are seeking is behind the blue door. Painting
a door blue does not satisfy the goal of finding the
blue door — it merely obscures the entity of the
appropriate door. (Etzioni et al., 1992, p.116)
This is an example of the incorrect interpreta-
tion (painting a door blue) that a conversational
system can assign to a command when the system
does not have complete information about the en-
vironment and has no restrictions on the order in
which it can execute actions.
A first conclusion given this observation would
be that only sensing actions (and not physical ac-
tions) should be allowed before referring actions
are resolved. However, it might be the case, for ex-
ample, that the blue door is in a different room, so
the physical action of moving should be allowed
before resolving the reference. A more refined ap-
proach would be then to leave the relevant prop-
erties of the definite description unchanged until
the referred object is found. Current off-the-shelf
planners provide ways in which to represent prop-
erties that must not change (usually called hands-
off properties). Using this it is possible to model
the fact that searching for a blue door is legitimate,
whereas painting some door blue is not.
2.2 Tacit grounding and sensing
During dialogue, grounding acts are frequently
left tacit. Consider the following example:
A[1]: Helen did not come to the party.
B[2]: How do you know that?
A[3]: Her car wasn’t there.
B[4]: She could have come by bicycle.
(Kreutel and Matheson, 2003, p.6)
In this example, [4] tacitly grounds the asser-
tion [3] (Helen’s car wasn’t there) but [4] also re-
jects the fact that [3] is a reason for [1]. In other
words, [4] performs two dialogue acts that can be
made explicit with “[4’]: Ok, her car wasn’t there.
She could have come by bicycle”. Notice that [4]
cannot tacitly reject the assertion [3], something
is wrong with: “??I saw her car there. She could
have come by bicycle”.
Sensing actions offer a whole new world for
tacit grounding in situated interaction. After giv-
ing an instruction, for example, just sensing the
results of the required acts is often the best way
to know whether the addressee understood (and
hence, grounded) the instruction. If you tell your
daughter “Turn off the light of your room” and,
when you come back, the light is off then you are
pretty sure that she heard you.
2.3 Sensing and tacit exogenous events
Unobserved exogenous events can change the
value of properties that have already been sensed.
So we may well be faced with the treatment of
not only incomplete but also incorrect informa-
tion. But if we assume that the state of the world
evolves via the effects of actions and events, then
there is a intuitive approach for updating sensed
values. Whenever a sensed property needs to be
updated in order to make sense of the evolution
of the interaction, a tacit exogenous event that up-
dates this property can be inferred. In the follow-
ing example, Andrew might have sensed that the
contents of the pot were raw, but after a while he
observe Bess’s actions and update his knowledge.
Perhaps only Bess will see when the contents of
her boiling pot have cooked. Andrew might still
infer that this event has taken place from observing
Bess’s actions — say, by watching Bess turn off
the heat or empty the pot. (Thomason et al., 2006,
p.16)
In this three subsections we have shown every-
day examples of the interaction of sensing acts,
physical acts and dialogue acts. But these are only
the tip of the iceberg. We believe that research on
such interactions will be fundamental to deepen-
ing our understanding of situated dialogue. But
how can we model these interactions? This is the
topic of the next two sections.
3 A technical framework for tacit sensing
In this section we will introduce the two systems
used to implement the ideas discussed in the pre-
vious section. We first briefly present our conver-
sational application (the text adventure game), and
then describe the main features of the planner that
we use for our formalization and case-studies.
3.1 Situated interaction in a text-adventure
We have implemented a text-adventure game
which can interpret commands that require tacit
sensing. In this game-engine, the player can be
embedded in different simulated game environ-
ments. The player can issue natural language re-
quests to the game in order to manipulate and
change the game environment. She can request
to sense the game objects through special actions
such as read; or directly perceive the environment
(for example, every time the player enters a new
room the game describes it). The situated per-
spective, and the answers generated by the game
as a result of the player requests, allow the player
to discover the rules by which her environment
is governed and to extend her knowledge accord-
ingly.
A game scenario is represented by several in-
formational components: a database that specifies
STRIPS-like actions (Fikes et al., 1972), a gram-
mar, a lexicon, and two description logic knowl-
edge bases (Baader et al., 2003) that share a set of
definitions (one knowledge base models the player
knowledge and the other the game scenario). The
natural language processing module receives the
player command and outputs a flat semantic repre-
sentation that is used by the action handling mod-
ule to modify the game scenario. The natural
language generation module verbalizes the results
of the player actions. (Benotti, 2007) describes
how classical planning capabilities can be inte-
grated into the architecture of the game-engine.
Such planning abilities allow the game to infer
physical actions left tacit by the player using the
off-the-shelf planner Blackbox (Kautz and Sel-
man, 1999). Blackbox implements classical plan-
ning techniques and assumes complete knowledge
about the planning domain. In this paper, the plan-
ner PKS (Planning with Knowledge and Sensing)
is used in order to investigate the case in which
sensing actions are tacit.
3.2 Planning with knowledge and sensing
PKS (Petrick and Bacchus, 2002) is a knowledge-
based planner that is able to construct conditional
plans in the presence of incomplete knowledge.
PKS builds plans by reasoning about the effects of
actions on an agent’s knowledge state, as opposed
to other approaches based on possible-world rea-
soning. By reasoning at the knowledge level,
PKS can avoid some of the irrelevant distinctions
that occur at the world level, improving efficiency
and producing natural plans. The PKS specifica-
tion language offers features such as functions and
variables, allowing it to solve problems that can
be difficult for traditional planners (and making it
ideal for non-traditional dialogue systems).
PKS is based on a generalization of STRIPS. In
STRIPS, the world state is modelled by a single
database. In PKS, the planners knowledge state,
rather than the world state, is represented by a
tuple 〈Kf , Kw, Kv, Kx〉 of databases whose con-
tents have a fixed, formal interpretation in epis-
temic logic. Actions are specified as updates
to these databases using the knowledge primi-
tives know fact which modifies the database Kf ,
know value which modifies the database Kv, know
whether which modifies the database Kw, and
know which which modifies the database Kx.
We briefly describe these four databases here.
Kf is like a standard STRIPS database except that
both positive and negative facts are stored and
the closed world assumption does not apply. Kv
stores information about function values that will
become known at execution time, such as the plan-
time effects of sensing actions that return numeric
values. Kw models the plan-time effects of bi-
nary sensing actions that sense the truth value of a
proposition. Kx models the agent’s exclusive dis-
junctive knowledge of literals (that is, the agent
knows that exactly one literal from a set is true).
PKS performance has been tested for the com-
position of web services with promising re-
sults (Martinez and Lesperance, 2004). More-
over, in the prototype we have implemented us-
ing PKS inside our text-adventure game, PKS re-
sponse time was acceptable (less than 2 seconds)
for the kind of planning problems that the text ad-
venture typically gives rise to. We tested it using
the breadth first search strategy, rather than depth
first because we require optimal length plans.
4 Tacit sensing: 2 case-studies
In this section we are going to explain in detail
how a command issued by the player that includes
tacit sensing actions is interpreted using PKS, and
then executed by the game. We first classify sens-
ing actions as either disjunctive or existential. We
then present a case-study of disjunctive knowledge
that makes use of conditional plans. Finally, we
describe a case-study of existential knowledge that
makes use of parametric plans.
4.1 Incomplete knowledge and sensing
There are two sorts of sensing actions, correspond-
ing to the two ways an agent can gather informa-
tion about the world at run-time. On the one hand,
a sensing action can observe the truth value of a
proposition P (c), resulting in a conditional plan.
The kind of incomplete knowledge sensed by this
kind of action can be described as binary because
it represents the fact that the agent knows which
of the two disjuncts in P (c) ∨ ¬P (c) is true. In
PKS, binary sensing actions are those that mod-
ify the Kw knowledge base. On the other hand,
a sensing action can identify an object that has a
particular property, resulting in a plan that con-
tains run-time variables. The kind of incomplete
knowledge sensed by these kind of action can be
described as existential because it represents the
fact that the agent knows a witness for ∃x.P (x).
In PKS, existential sensing actions are those that
modify the Kv database.
We will now explain in detail how these two
kinds of sensing actions can be left tacit by the
player in our text-adventure game.
We said that our model can handle incomplete
knowledge about the interaction in which a di-
alogue is situated. But how incomplete is the
knowledge the model can handle? There are sev-
eral levels at which knowledge can be incomplete.
The most studied scenario is one in which not all
the properties and relations of the objects involved
in the task are known, but the set of objects is fi-
nite and all objects are named (that is all objects
are associated with a constant). If this simplifying
assumption is made, existential and disjunctive in-
complete knowledge collapse; one can be defined
in terms of the other. If all objects are named, the
fact that there exists an object that satisfies a par-
ticular property can be expressed as the disjunc-
tion of that property applied to all the objects in
the domain. However, we cannot make this sim-
plifying assumption because we are dealing with
an environment where not all objects are known
at plan time. Thus we not only need to study the
use of disjunctive plans, we also need plans with
run-time variables.
4.2 Tacit actions in conditional plans
We are going to analyze commands issued by the
player that involve the execution of binary sensing
actions that result in conditional plans.
In order to motivate conditional plans, let us
consider an example. Suppose that the player is
in a room with a locked door. She is looking
around searching for a way to open the door, when
the game says that there are two keys (one silver
and one golden) lying on a table in front of her.
Then she inputs the command “Open the door”.
Correctly executing this command in the state of
the game described amounts to executing the fol-
lowing conditional plan. The plan involves taking
both keys, trying the silver one in the door, and (if
it fits) unlocking and opening the door; otherwise
the golden key is used.
<init>
take(silver_key,table)
take(golden_key,table)
trykey(silver_key,door)
<branch,fits_in(silver_key,door)>
<k+>:
unlock(door,silver_key)
open(door)
<k->:
unlock(door,golden_key)
open(door)
But should the game execute this plan for the
player? There is no definitive answer to this ques-
tion unless we refine it further; we need to con-
sider what the goal of such a text-adventure game
is. For a start, it certainly shares a number of sim-
ilarities with task-oriented dialogue systems (such
as (Ferguson et al., 1996)). In particular, like
task-oriented dialogue systems, our text-adventure
has knowledge of the task; it models the steps in-
volved in the task and how to talk about them. But
task-oriented dialogue systems typically strive to
solve the task as efficiently as possible, even if this
leads to unnatural dialogue. On the other hand,
for games (and indeed for tutoring systems too)
efficiency in task performance and brevity is not
necessarily an advantage; the longer the interac-
tion the greater the opportunity of having a useful
interactive experience (and more opportunity for
learning). If we take this perspective, then a nat-
ural answer to our question would be: the game
should not open the door for the player; rather it
must force the player to perform all the steps on
her own so that she will learn the task.
However, in order for a game to be engaging it
cannot force the player to do repetitive tasks over
and over again. In games, rules are not stated in
advance; games require the skills of rule discovery
through observation, trial and error, and hypothe-
sis testing. Figuring out the rules governing the
behavior of a dynamic representation is basically
the cognitive process of inductive discovery, and
this is challenging and motivating. But once a rule
is learned, the player will no longer find it motivat-
ing to automatically apply it again and again. How
to best use facts and rules that the player learned
is an issue that needs to be carefully considered
when deciding how a system should behave.
So, what’s the answer to our question? What
should the game do? Or in more general terms,
when can this command (which gives rise to par-
ticular implicatures) felicitously occur? This de-
pends on what has already happened in the game.
Has the player already been through enough expe-
riences to have the knowledge that is necessary in
order to “open the door”? If yes, don’t force the
player to repeat the boring steps.
But how can we represent the knowledge that
is necessary in order to find the conditional plan
involved by this command, in order to leave the
necessary actions tacit? To illustrate our explana-
tion, let us go back to the concrete input “Open the
door” and its conditional plan and analyze how it
is handled by the system. The sensing action in-
volved in the conditional plan is trykey defined
in PKS as follows:
<action name="trykey">
<params>?x, ?y</params>
<preconds>
Kf(accessible(?x)) ˆ
Kf(locked(?x)) ˆ
Kf(key(?y)) ˆ
Kf(inventory_object(?y))
</preconds>
<effects>
add(Kw, fits_in(?y,?x));
</effects>
</action>
Intuitively, after executing the action
trykey(?x,?y) the agent knows whether a
particular key ?x fits in a locked object ?y or not.
Is this knowledge enough to find the conditional
plan above? No, because it could be the case that
none of the two keys fit into the door. If this is
a possibility, then the conditional plan may not
achieve the goal Kf(open(door)). In order to rule
out this possibility the following facts have to the
added to the initial state of the planning problem:
add(Kx, fits_in(k1,c1)|fits_in(k2,c1))
Given this information, PKS is able to come up
with the conditional plan above.
In its current version, PKS only returns disjunc-
tive plans that will always be successful given the
specification of the planning problem. It doesn’t
matter what the actual configuration of the world
is, PKS guaranties that there will be a branch in
the plan that achieves the goal. If this cannot be
achieved then PKS will say that there is no plan.
However, it might be the case that there is some
conditional plan that is successful for most but not
all configurations of the world. It would be inter-
esting to have a planner that could provide plans
for these cases, even when some of the branches
will not achieve the goal.
Implementation details
Conditional plans are executed by decomposing
them in disjunctive plans. For example, the con-
ditional plan shown above can be decomposed in
two disjunctive plans, namely:
take(silver_key,table)
take(golden_key,table)
unlock(door,silver_key)
open(door)
and
take(silver_key,table)
take(golden_key,table)
unlock(door,golden_key)
open(door)
These two disjunctive plans can be directly in-
serted in the game flow. In the game, the seman-
tic representation of a command is in disjunctive
normal form (that is, it is a disjunction of conjunc-
tion of actions). Each disjunct corresponds to a
different reading of the command, hence a com-
mand’s semantic representation will contain more
than one disjunct if the command is ambiguous.
Here, each branch of the plan can be reinserted
into the game flow as a disjunct in the semantic
representation of the command. Only one of the
branches will be successfully executed since the
sensed information is known to be exclusive (only
one of the keys fits).
4.3 Run-time variables in tacit actions
In this section we are going to analyze commands
issued by the player that involve the execution
of existential sensing actions. Existential sensing
actions result in parametric plans, that is, plans
that include actions with run-time variables, val-
ues that will only be known at run time.
In order to motivate parametric plans, let us con-
sider an example in a multiplayer game scenario.
There is a player called Beatrix who has found a
room with a panel where the location of all other
players can be checked. Beatrix knows that in this
game scenario, a player can drive herself to any
other location if she knows the destination, and
that in order to kill someone you have to be in
the same place. Beatrix wants Bill dead and so
she utters the command “Kill Bill”. How do we
have to represent this information so that the plan-
ner will be able to come up with a successful plan?
The goal of the command can be represented with
Kf(dead(bill)) and the information about how
the game world works that is already available to
Beatrix can be represented with the following ac-
tion schemas:
<action name="checklocation">
<params>?x</params>
<preconds>
Kf(player(?x))
</preconds>
<effects>
add(Kv, haslocation(?x));
</effects>
</action>
<action name="drive">
<params>?x,?y</params>
<preconds>
Kf(player(?x)) ˆ
Kv(?y) ˆ
Kf(haslocation(?x)!=?y)
</preconds>
<effects>
add(Kf, haslocation(?x)=?y);
</effects>
</action>
<action name="kill">
<params>?x, ?y</params>
<preconds>
Kf(player(?x)) ˆ
Kf(player(?y)) ˆ
Kf(haslocation(?x)=haslocation(?y))
</preconds>
<effects>
add(Kf, dead(?y));
</effects>
</action>
With this information and a factual representa-
tion of the initial state the planner should return
the following parametric plan. The plan involves
checking Bill’s location in the panel, driving to
that location and killing Bill. The plan is not fully
instantiated, as the actual location of Bill will only
become known when the command is executed.
checklocation(bill)
drive(beatrix,haslocation(bill))
kill(beatrix,bill)
When the action drive is actually executed in
the game, Bill’s location can be obtained from
the player knowledge base because the action
checklocation will already have been executed.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we studied Lewis’s broad notion of
accommodation as a natural schema for treating
tacit dialogue acts, tacit physical acts and tacit
sensing acts in a uniform way, and we analyzed ex-
amples of the interaction among these three types
of acts. In particular, we looked at sensing acts and
two widely studied dialogue acts: grounding and
referring. We also investigated phenomena usu-
ally studied in collaborative models of reasoning,
such as exogenous events, using this same schema.
Following this agenda, our final aim is to reconcile
linguistic reasoning and collaborative reasoning in
situated conversation.
We then turn to the question of how to model
these interactions. For this purpose we integrated
the planner PKS in a text-adventure game. PKS
is a knowledge-based planner that is able to con-
struct conditional and parametric plans. Such
planning abilities allow the game to infer phys-
ical and sensing actions left tacit by the player.
We believe that the non-traditional setup offered
by the game is particularly suited to the study of
the differences between collaborative task solving
and other (less collaborative) types of interaction.
The work presented in this paper is in its early
stages, and it is crucial to carry out an empirical
test of our claims. But we believe that we have
started to define a path which is worth following
for two main reasons. On the theoretical side, we
believe that the use of different kinds of tacit ac-
tions is omnipresent in human interaction and will
help generalize the theory of accommodation. On
the practical side, sensing actions are an essential
component if we want to build situated dialogue
systems that are able to interact in a realistic way.
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